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EAD Calibration for Corporate Credit Lines  
 
  Managing the credit risk inherent to a corporate credit line is similar to that of a term 
loan, but with one key difference. For both instruments, the bank should know the borrower’s 
probability of default (PD) and the facility’s loss given default (LGD). However, since a 
credit line allows the borrowers to draw down the committed funds according to their own 
needs, the bank must also have a measure of the line’s exposure at default (EAD). In fact, 
EAD is one of the key parameters used for regulatory capital calculations within the Basel II 
Framework. Yet, relatively few empirical studies of EAD for corporate credit lines have been 
published, mainly due to a lack of data. A primary goal of this article is to provide calibrated 
values for use in EAD calculations for corporate credit lines. 
 
  Our study is based on the Spanish credit register, which provides a census of all 
corporate lending within Spain over the last twenty years. The length and breadth of this 
dataset allows us to provide the most comprehensive overview of corporate credit line use 
and EAD calculations to date. Our analysis shows that defaulting firms have significantly 
higher credit line usage rates and EAD values up to five years prior to their actual default. 
Furthermore, we find that there are important variations in EAD values due to credit line size, 
collateralization, and maturity. While our results are derived from data for a single country, 
they should provide useful benchmarks for further academic, business and policy research 
into this under-developed area of credit risk management. 
 
Definitions and literature review 
  Bank credit lines are a major source of funding and liquidity for firms. For example, 
Sufi (2008) found that credit lines account for over 80% of the bank financing provided to 
U.S. public firms, while Kashyap et al. (2002) found that 70% of bank borrowing by U.S. 
small firms is through credit lines. For Spanish firms, the subject of our study, credit lines 
account for an average of 42% of firms’ bank financing and 32% of banks’ total new lending.  
 
  To set our terminology clearly, we define a corporate credit line as a loan commitment 
in which the borrower has the option to draw down funds up to the commitment amount 
under certain conditions. For risk management purposes, a bank’s EAD through credit line i 
at time t for a default horizon τ, which we denote as EADit(τ), is the sum of the actual drawn 
amount at time t and a fraction of the undrawn amount, where that fraction takes into account 
the default horizon. This fraction is commonly known as the loan equivalent amount (LEQ)   11
and is the key parameter in EAD estimation and calibration.
1 Using notation,  
 
( ) ( ) it it it it EAD DRAWN LEQ *UNDRAWN , τ= + τ  
 
where DRAWNit and UNDRAWNit represent the monetary value of the drawn and undrawn 
portions of a credit line at time t. The sum of these two values is clearly the total commitment 
amount. For credit lines with a non-zero undrawn amount, LEQ for a default that occurs τ 












Since DRAWNit+τ  is not observable at time t, it must be replaced with a forecast for 
operational purposes. Hence, the challenge in generating EAD values is to find reasonable 
LEQ estimates. 
 
  Three empirical studies providing calibrated LEQ estimates are publicly available. 
Asarnow and Marker (1995) present LEQ estimates based on credit lines issued by Citibank 
to publicly-rated North American firms over the five-year period from 1987 to 1992. They 
report an average LEQ value of just over 60% with a roughly downward sloping trend from 
69% for AAA-rated firms to 44% for CCC-rated firms. The intuition behind this trend is that 
in case of default, lower-rated firms typically have already drawn down a reasonable portion 
of their credit lines and are less likely to drawn down as much of their remaining commitment 
as highly-rated firms.  
 
  The LEQ estimates provided by Araten and Jacobs (2001) are based on 408 credit 
facilities to 399 defaulted U.S. borrowers issued by the former Chase Manhattan Bank over 
the six-year period from 1994 to 2000. Their reported average LEQ is about 43%. They 
examined LEQ values at several default horizons and found LEQit(τ) to be an increasing 
function of τ, ranging from 33% at one year prior to default to 72% at five years prior. The 
intuition here is that as default approaches (i.e., as τ decreases), borrowers that eventually 
default are more likely to have drawn down more of their credit lines earlier. They also found 
that LEQs declined with risk ratings, but that a variety of other variables, such as 
                                                 
1 See Moral (2006) for further technical discussion. Note that we ignore any net accrued, but as yet unpaid, 
interest and fees in this study. 
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commitment size and borrower industry, did not impact their estimated LEQ values. 
 
  The study by Jacobs (2008) is the most comprehensive of the three, encompassing 
3,281 defaulted instruments from 720 U.S. borrowers with public credit ratings over the 
period from 1985 through 2006. In addition to providing univariate analysis of the 
relationship between LEQ values and other variables related to the firm’s balance sheet and 
the credit line’s characteristics, the author estimates a multivariate model based on 
generalized linear regression. The average LEQ measure for the complete sample is 39%. 
Across default horizons, he found that LEQit(τ) was a generally increasing function of τ, 
ranging from 33% at one year prior to default to 48% at four years prior. However, the LEQ 
value declined to 26% at five years prior to default, perhaps in part due to the few datapoints 
available in the sample. Credit ratings also had a negative relationship with average LEQ 
values in this study, ranging from 76% for BBB-rated firms to 22% for D-rated firms. While 
commitment size and collateral rank had positive, but relatively small, effects on LEQ values, 
other firm characteristics, such as profit, did have a statistically significant effect. 
 
Our data and calibration methods 
Our LEQ estimates are based on the Spanish credit register, which is known as the 
Central de Información de Riesgos (CIR), and is maintained by the Banco de España. The 
CIR contains information on all corporate loan commitments of more than €6,000 granted by 
any bank operating in Spain over the twenty-year period from 1984 to 2005; see Jiménez et 
al. (2008) for a more detailed description of the database and its coverage of corporate credit 
lines. The definition of default used in the CIR database is that the borrower has loan 
payments overdue by more than 90 days, which is the legal definition of default in Spain, or 
that it has been classified as a doubtful borrower by the bank (i.e., the lender believes there is 
a high probability of non-payment). As shown in Table 1, the number of defaults rose sharply 
during the recessionary period of 1993 and declined at a relatively slow pace until 2005. 
 
Our database consists of new corporate credit. Despite the fact that most credit lines 
nominally have a maturity of one year or less, it is common to find them in the database again 
the following year with exactly the same characteristics (in particular, their commitment size) 
and changing only in the amount drawn. For our analysis, we assume it is the same credit 
line, and we classify the observations as having both short maturities and line ages greater 
than their recorded maturities. After filtering the data, our sample includes 696,445 credit 
lines granted to 334,442 firms by 404 banks. The commitment size has an interquartile range   13
of between €30,000 and €150,000 with a median value of €60,000. Our sample clearly 
contains more small business loans than examined in the previously noted studies. Of these 
lines, 4,289 of them were granted to 4,094 firms that defaulted; these lines have an 
interquartile range of between €30,000 and €96,000 with a median value of €48,000. Figure 1 
presents the histogram of our credit line usage rates across firms and time, where the usage 












While just over 23% of the credit line-year observations amass at the endpoints, the 
remaining 77% are distributed almost symmetrically around the median value of 50%. 
 
When analyzing credit line usage rates, we find that firms that default on their credit 
lines draw down more funds than firms that do not default, even up to five years before the 
default year; see Jiménez et al. (2008) for complete details of this analysis. At five years 
prior, the average usage rate for defaulting firms is about 25% higher than that of non-
defaulting firms. As default approaches, these firms draw down their credit lines at an 
increasing rate. At the default year, the average usage ratio for defaulting firms is 75% larger 
than that for non-defaulting. The empirical insight that defaulting firms exhibit higher usage 
rates up to five years prior to defaulting suggests a potentially important link between PD and 
EAD modeling.  
 
LEQ calibration results  
  As mentioned previously, generating reasonable EAD values for credit risk 
management purposes requires accurate LEQ estimates.
2 Using the defaulted credit lines in 
our dataset, we generate average LEQ estimates for several default horizons and other 
relevant categories. Note that the LEQ values for certain credit lines may fall outside the unit 
interval (i.e., be negative or greater than 100%) due to data issues, and in these cases, we 
round these values to the appropriate unit interval endpoint.
3 
 
                                                 
2Note that another methodology frequently employed by practitioners is to generate LEQ estimates as the 
coefficient of a linear regression without a constant term of ( ) it it RDRAWN RDRAWN







see Moral (2006) for further details. The patterns of the LEQ values derived from this procedure as applied to 
our dataset are similar to those presented here, although their level is roughly ten percentage points higher.   14
  The average LEQ value for the entire dataset is 59.6%, which is in line with the value 
reported by Asarnow and Marker (1995) and higher than that reported by Araten and Jacobs 
(2001) as well as Jacobs (2008). Looking at our LEQit(τ) estimates for  [ ] 1,5 τ∈  as presented 
in Figure 2, we find an upward sloping pattern, as in Araten and Jacobs (2001) as well as 
Jacobs (2008). However, the magnitudes of our estimates are higher and range from 48% at 
one year prior to default to 76% at five years prior to default. In other words, in our dataset, 
firms that will default on their credit lines in five years time can be expected to draw down, 
on average, about three-quarters of their undrawn commitments, and this value declines to 
50% in the year prior to default. 
 
  We also find that the commitment size, collateralization and maturity of the credit 
lines has an effect on the calibrated LEQit(τ) patterns. As shown in Figure 3 and Table 2, the 
largest credit lines (i.e., the fourth size quartile) have the lowest LEQ values at all default 
horizons, perhaps since the larger firms that can get larger credit lines from their banks have 
access to other funding sources and are less likely to use their credit lines, even as default 
approaches.  
 
Regarding collateral, higher-quality borrowers should be willing to provide collateral 
as a signal of their confidence in their repayment ability, as discussed by Jiménez et al. 
(2006). This assumption would suggest lower LEQ values as these borrowers would be less 
likely to draw down their lines, even if they eventually default, in order to protect their 
collateral from being seized. Figure 4 and Table 3 present empirical results that support this 
hypothesis. While the average LEQit(τ) values at the longer default horizons are essentially 
the same, they are significantly different at the 1% significance level for the default horizons 
from one to three years. The difference is particularly stark at one year prior to default where 
uncollateralized lines see over half of their available commitments drawn down, whereas 
collateralized lines only experience a 30% drawn rate, on average. 
 
Figure 5 and Table 4 present the LEQ estimates for credit lines with maturities greater 
than and less than (or equal to) one year. Again, the average LEQit(τ) values at the longer 
default horizons are indistinguishable, but they are significantly different for the shorter 
horizons. The LEQ estimates for the longer-term credit lines are lower, suggesting that 
higher-quality firms that are able to get such longer commitments from their lenders are less 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 See Jacobs (2008) for further discussion of alternative LEQ methods.   15
likely to draw down these funds, even in light of a pending default. In contrast, lower-quality 
firms that can only access shorter-term funding are much more dependent on these funds and 
thus more likely to draw down these credit lines. 
 
Conclusion 
  Corporate credit lines are a key product for banks, and the management of their 
inherent credit risks requires calibration of their EAD parameters. Using the credit register 
maintained by Banco de España, we construct an extensive database of defaulted corporate 
credit lines over a twenty-year period to calibrate the key LEQ component of these EAD 
values at various default horizons. Our results show that a variety of factors – such as 
commitment size, collateralization and maturity – influence the LEQ calibrations. Our 
conclusion is that banks must address these factors in their EAD calibration processes, even if 
regulatory capital guidelines do not explicitly require it. Our results should provide 
reasonable starting values for most of these calibrations, but future work across different 
countries and time periods is necessary. 
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Table 1. 
Number of defaulted credit lines in our sample 
 



























Figure 1.  
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Figure 2.  
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Figure 3.  












Size Q1 Size Q2 Size Q3 Size Q4
 
 
Note: Qi denotes the i
th quartile of the total commitment size of the credit line. The endpoints of the four quartiles are 





Table 2.  










Note: Qi denotes the i
th quartile of the total commitment size of the credit line. The endpoints of the four quartiles are 
[€6,000, €36,000] for Q1, [€37,000, €65,000] for Q2, [€66,000, €139,000] for Q3, and [€140,000, €69,513,000] for Q4.
# years 
to default Size Q1 Size Q2 Size Q3 Size Q4
1 53.8 51.1 50.2 38.4
2 72.2 71.7 65.9 54.7
3 79.5 74.9 73.7 61.8
4 73.5 76.0 80.3 66.1
5 74.1 84.4 74.4 70.0  20
 Figure 4.  
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Table 3.  







1 51.5 31.4 9.14 0.00 ***
2 68.6 51.5 5.13 0.00 ***
3 74.4 57.1 3.36 0.00 ***
4 74.4 74.5 0.00 1.00  
5 76.3 78.9 -0.17 0.87  
Mean test  9
Figure 5.  
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Table 4.  
Average LEQit(τ) (%) for defaulted credit lines depending on maturity 
 
  # years 
to default ≤ 1 year > 1 year
1 53.1 36.7 8.74 0.00 ***
2 69.9 55.6 5.42 0.00 ***
3 75.9 60.6 4.05 0.00 ***
4 75.7 68.9 1.25 0.21  
5 75.8 80.4 -0.65 0.52  
Mean test